









BEACH-SEINE NET FISHING: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC 




This paper examines the economic effects of management policies on four of the seven beach-seine net 
fishing operations in False Bay. The effects of past regulations are examined by assessing whether or 
not this industry is at present profitable. It was found that under the present management policies all 
fishing crews are profitable. A new policy preventing fishermen from catching white steenbras has 
been introduced. This was examined and it was shown that only one of the crews examined would be 
effected. Two proposed policies were examined to determine their impact on the sector. The first 
proposal aims to remove kob as a target species, however none of the crews would be significantly 
effected by this proposal. The second proposal aims to restrict fishing to working days, this proposal 
would result in collapse of two crews. Long term feasibility was examined using three models that 
predict the NPV of income for each crew under different assumptions. It was shown that if stocks 
continue to decline and white steenbras remains restricted all crews except one would collapse. If 
stocks improve but the catching of white steenbras remains prohibited for IO years, one of the crews 
will collapse. The final section assessed the validity of a proposal that the Marine Resource Fund be 
used to buy trek fishermen's permits, it was concluded that this is not a feasible proposal. 
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The earliest reports of beach-seine net fishing date back to 1652 when Jan van Riebeeck sent crew 
members to seine fish in Table Bay (Thompson 1913). As European ships began docking in South 
Africa the demand for fish grew and beach-seine net fishing became the first commercial fishery in 
South Africa (Penny 1991). Before 1900 beach seining and gill netting were responsible for the bulk of 
the catch along the South African coastline. The 20th century saw the development of modem offshore 
fishing techniques; this marked the decline in prominence of beach-seine net fishery (Lamberth 1994 ). 
By 1950 beach-seine net fishing contributed negligibly to total annual catch and at present is the 
smallest fishing sector in False Bay. 
Even though the proportional contribution beach seine-net fishing made to total national catch declined 
the industry itself didn't shrink and was allowed to continue operating as an unregulated open access 
fishery. This however changed in the 1960's when management began to regulate this sector. Over the 
last 30 years the evolution of the False Bay trek fishing industry has been driven by management' 
policies many of which, were created due to pressure from recreational anglers who claimed that trek 
fishermen were degrading the marine environment2. The conflict between recreational and trek 
fishermen occurs due to the fact that both sectors fish from the beach and catch species which inhabit 
the sandy beach surf zone. Furthermore this conflict is characterised by an imbalance of power between 
these two groups. The recreational fishing sector's participants are mostly "white"3 males earning 
incomes that fall in the top two quintiles of income distributions. In contrast, Hutchings (2000) showed 
that beach seine-net fishermen are largely "coloured"3 males with incomes falling below the upper two 
quintiles of income distribution for South Africa. Due to recreational fishermen's relative wealth, 
access to power and in the past their race they have been able to enforce their will through management 
decisions 4. Hutchings (2000) stated that many management decisions have been taken without either 
scientific evidence or knowledge of their implications. He argues that the net fishery's recent history in 
the Western Cape is typified by management decisions that have aimed to reduce conflict between net 
fisheries and other fishing sectors. 
1 The term management refers to the Department of Sea Fisheries. 
2 Lamberth (1994) investigated a list of complaints recreational fishermen have made over the years (see appendix A). He 
found that the trek fishermen were having no significant impact on the marine environment. 
3 It is important to note that the words white and coloured are social constructs, they imply different social context, power to 
affect change, historical positions and socio-economic standings. It should be noted that the coloured population was 
marginalised during the apartheid era and this legacy is still evident within the trek-fishing sector. 
4 The False Bay trek fishing industry is one of the most regulated fisheries in the country. Appendix B gives a list of the 
current regulations imposed on the fishery 
It is against this backdrop that this paper was written. There are three broad objectives of this paper. 
Firstly, to assess the current profitability of the sector under the prevailing management measures. 
Second, to examine how new and proposed regulations will impact on the profitability of the sector. 
Third, to addresses the validity of a proposal by recreational fishermen that the Marine Resource Use 
Fund be used to buy the False Bay trek fishermen's permits. 
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The paper addresses these issues by first describing what trek fishing is, where it occurs within False 
Bay and who partakes in the industry. This is followed by an explanation of how trek fishermen earn 
their revenue. Hereafter the costs are discussed and the income fishermen earn is presented, the present 
profitability of the sector is thus addressed. The next section examines the effect of a new regulation 
that prevents fishermen from catching white steenbras5. Two proposed regulations ( one that aims to 
prevent fishing on public holidays and weekends and one that aims to prevents the capture of kob) are 
also examined to determine their effect on profitability. Once this has been done the paper puts forward 
three models predicting income over the next 30 years. These models are used to assess the long-term 
feasibility of the sector under the new and proposed management policies discussed above. The final 
section addresses the proposal that trek-fishing permits should be bought. 
2. Methods: 
The data collected for this report was obtained from two sources. First, catch records from the 
department of Sea Fisheries: From these the total monthly catch of each species for each operator was 
obtained. However Lamberth ( 1994) noted that these records were consistently under reported. On the 
basis of observation he developed a scale by which each species was under reported. The catch records 
used were adjusted using Lamberth' s (1994) scaling. A further weakness in this data was that, of the 
seven permit holders only five had handed in catch return cards. Thus the Simons Town and one of the 
Fishoek crews were omitted from the report. 
5 White steenbras has been removed as a target species from the 2001/2002 onwards due to its low stock levels. 
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Second, interviews and telephonic surveys were conducted from May to July during the year 2000. 
Permit holders and crewmembers were interviewed at their homes. Of the total number of permit 
holders only four were willing to be interviewed, Muizenberg/Strandfontein and Macassar, 
Muizenberg/Strandfontein, Fishoek and Smitswinkel Bay operators. From each of these operations five 
crewmembers were interviewed. Due to the fact that the interviews were conducted in winter when 
many operations close down it was not possible to obtain an adequate sample of crewmembers. 
Interviews were conducted on a basis of availability of interviewees. Hence only the more established 
crewmembers were interviewed. Permit holders and crewmembers were questioned with regard to life 
history in relation to fishing and particularly trek fishing, income, costs, management practises, crew 
practices, and fish sales, prices and socio-economic status. The False Bay beach-seine net fishermen 
have been under close scrutiny for many years and feel suspicious and distrustful toward any interview. 
Thus it was not possible to use a questionnaire and all information received during interviews had to be 
validated by other sources. Information pertaining to prices and selling and buying practices was 
obtained from an interview with I&J's6 fish buyer, who buys the bulk of the trek fishermen's catch. 
Telephonic interviews were conducted with restaurants to ascertain whether fish are bought and if so 
what price is paid. Finally the suppliers of fishing equipment were interviewed to determine the 
replacement cost of equipment. Due to the nature of this industry and the methods employed by this 
paper, there are often contradictions between sources of information. These contradictions are noted in 
the relevant sections. 
3. The False Bay Beach- Seine Net Fishery 
3.1 Beach-Seine Net Fishing Techniques. 
Before discussing the beach seine net industry in False Bay it is imperative to explain what beach seine 
net fishing is. A seine net is a fishing net containing floats on the top and weights on the bottom 
thereby enabling the net to hang vertically downwards from the surface of the water. The net is set 
around a shoal of fish and the ends are brought together catching the fish in what is colloquially called 
the "kuil" or bag of the net. Seine nets are used in two fishing industries in South Africa, namely, the 
purse seine net industry ( where nets are set from boats at sea) and the beach seine net industry ( where 
nets are set from the beach). 
6 I&J is an old well-established commercial fishing company, which is listed on the JSE. 
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A beach seining operation is run as follows ( see figure 1 ): One crewmember ("the spotter") visually 
locates a shoal of fish from an elevated position ( cliffs or sand dunes depending on the site). Once a 
shoal is located he signals to the crew on the beach. Signalling is done using flags and whistles or two-
way radios depending on the spotter's distance from the beach. The crew holds one end of the headrope 
on the shore while the net is rowed around the shoal. A skipper "shoots"7 the net whilst steering the 
rowing boat around the shoal under the spotters directions. Once the net has encircled the shoal the boat 
is rowed to shore. By this stage the entire net is released from the boat and the remaining end of the 
headrope is held by crewmembers on the beach (DE Villiers 1995). The ends of the head rope are then 
pulled together catching the shoal in the "kuil" of the net. The net is then pulled ashore (Hutchings 
2000). Beach-seine net fishermen also practice what is known as "blinde" (blind) "treks" The 
techniques and equipment are identical to those described above but the fish are not located visually. 
Shoals are caught through a comprehensive knowledge of locations and environmental conditions most 
likely to yield catches (Lamberth et. al. 1994 ). A final method employed is the use of the "Russman" 
net8. The technique is as described above but the net used is heavily weighted and thus drags along the 
ocean floor. It is used to catch bottom dwelling species such as white steenbras (Lamberth et. al 1997). 
Since its inception to South Africa in 1652 there have been no significant changes to the technique trek 
fishermen employ. There have however been changes with regard to equipment: nylon nets have 
replaced cotton nets, dinghies are generally fibreglass and four wheel drive vehicles are used to 
transport equipment to fishing sites (Hutchings 2000). 
The average trek fishing crew contains 12 members, for all operations except the Smitswinkel Bay 
operation crewmembers are "coloured" males. The Smitswinkel Bay operation is made up of "white" 
males who exhibit a unique set of socio-economic characteristics. Furthermore each operation consists 
of four distinct labour groups: the permit holder, high-skilled permanent crewmembers, low-skilled 
permanent crewmembers and part-time crewmembers. The permit holder owns and maintains the 
equipment and in some cases is directly involved in fishing. High-skilled permanent crewmembers 
include one spotter, two-three rowers and one skipper9. Low-skilled permanent crewmembers haul the 
I net onto the beach. Similarly part-time crewmembers also haul the net but they only fish occasionally. 
Income is earned in accordance to the function and participation frequency crewmembers display. 
7 The term shooting refers to the releasing of the net behind the boat. 
8 The "Russman" net obtains it's name from it's Russian origin where it was used for catching sturgeon 
9 For each crew the number of rowers, spotters and skippers may vary due to equipment used and due to the fact that some 
functions are shared between crewmembers. 
l 
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Figure I .Beach seine-net fishing technique (Hutchings 2000). 
3.2 False Bay Beach-Seine Net Fishing Distribution. 
Beach seining can only be successfully undertaken on sandy low gradient beaches where launching of 
boats is possible and where a sandy substrate contains few obstacles that snag nets. Within False Bay 
the west and east coasts are rocky and inadequate for beach seining. Only the sandy northern shore and 
a few isolated beaches in the south are feasible options for the fishery (Penny 1991 ). In 1960 there were 
over 100 crews operating in False Bay. Management policies and the introduction of a permit system 10 
have reduced this number to a present total of seven. 
10 Permits are non-transferable and each permit is allotted for a specific area. 
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Along the northern shore there are three permits but only two permit holders (two permits are held by a 
single operator). This operator holds permits at Muizenberg/Strandfontein and at Macassar. 
The remainder of the paper refers to this operator as the Muizenberg/Strandfontein and Macassar 
operator. The section of beach that extends from Muizenberg to Strandfontein is shared with another 
operator who is referred to as the Muizenberg/Strandfontein operator. In the south two permits and two 
permit holders operate independently at Fishoek. With the remaining permits held at Simons Town, 
Glencarine and Smitswinkel Bay (see figure2) . 
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Figure 2. Map of False Bay indicating where beach-seine net fishermen mentioned in this study operate 
(Lamberth 1994). 
3.3 Socio-economic Characteristics of the False Bay Beach-seine Net Fishermen. 
This section aims introduce the fishermen to the reader. As was noted earlier only a limited number of 
participants in the industry were interviewed. It was therefore not possible to proceed \\1th any 
quantitative analysis. Hence a qualitative analysis was employed; whereby a summary of the socio-
economic characteristics of one crewmember from each of the four labour groups presented earlier is 
given 11. This is followed by a brief comparison of the similarities and differences this crewmember has 
with other crewmembers in the same labour group. 
11 It was not possible to locate part-time crewmembers for interviews. It is therefore important to note that a significant 
proportion of each crew has been omitted from this study. 
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Permit Holder. 
Mr H is a 48-year-old "coloured" male who has held a permit for 2 years. He was educated to 
standard 8 and has been working as a trek fishermen for the last 20 years. The original permit was 
held by his father who worked as a trek fishermen for over 40 years and who taught Mr H how to 
fish. Mr H's mother used to make all the nets for operation. However at 80 she finds this task 
impossible and now only mends nets. Mr H crewed for his father for 18 years, however this was in a 
part time capacity as he held a job with the Cape Town Municipal Council in the mornings. Two 
years ago his father died and there was dispute over whom would inherit the permit and equipment. 
Mr H was able to retain the permit but lost all the equipment. He has subsequently had to invest in 
new equipment. Mr H estimates that it will take 10 years before he has a complete set of equipment. 
Mr H runs the practical side of the operation while his wife manages the business side of the 
operation. The income earned from fishing is their sole source of income and supports 7 people. 
This paper estimates the household's annual income before tax to be R107 926 or R8993.8 per 
month. Furthermore he is burdened with monthly repayments on a house, car and all his equipment. 
Hence the household disposable income is low. Mr H when asked how he felt about the future of 
trek fishing argues: 
"I always look on the positive, but every year we face more regulations and restrictions which only 
make our life more difficult and keep us poor". 
Mr H argues that regulations imposed are based on political pressure from wealthy recreational 
fishermen and due to public outcry. During 2000 Mr H landed the biggest shoal of kob in recent 
memory. This sparked a public outcry and articles appeared in the local press accusing Mr Hand trek 
fishermen of catching undersized fish. Mr H argues that the public and recreational fishermen have 
no understanding of trek fishing operations. He states: 
"People think we catch every day, but most days especially in winter we do not fish and in summer 
we can't fish every day, even when we do fish we often wait days for a catch. People only notice 
when you make a rare big catch". 
Furthermore when catches are made particularly in summer there are many people on the beach. Mr 
H argued that the situation gets volatile as people attempt to steal fish. However even though he is 
faced with a large amount of opposition and the uncertainty inherent in this trade Mr H states: 
"I wouldn't do another job for twice the salary, I belong at the sea". 
Mr H's story was chosen as it illustrates the difficulty faced by permit holders in acquiring the initial 
capital to start their operations. Of the three remaining permit holders interviewed all are more 
established, have fewer dependants and more disposable income than Mr H. 
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Furthermore only one of these permit holders doesn' t rely solely on trek fishing for his income. Mr H 
and the other permit holders are all sceptical about the future of trek fishing and fear more regulations. 
Highly Skilled Permanent Crewmember 
Mr W is a 60 tear old coloured male with a standard 2 level of education. He started going fishing 
with his father when he was 10. Once he left school at the age of 12 he became part of a crew. 
Mr W' s father was a crewmember for Mr W's permit holder's father. It was his father who taught 
him the trade. He slowly progressed up the crewmember hierarchy, first as a rower, then skipper and 
finally as he got older as the spotter. He has been trekking in False Bay for 50 years. At present he 
works during the summer months as a trekker and in winter he buys fish from other fishing sectors. 
These fish are either dried or smoked and sold inland. Mr W estimates that 75% of his annual income 
comes from trekking. He lives in a house, which he owns together with his sister (who is a secretary 
and earns approximately R1600 a month). Mr W according to this study earns an income of R20 
358.9 from trek fishing. Thus his annual income is R27 145.7 or R2262.1 per month. Mr Wand his 
sister support 6 people. They are the only income earners but their house is paid off and all income 
earned is pooled and used to maintain the household. Mr W owns the only car in the household. 
When asked if he would have enjoyed another profession he answered 
"Never, I belong to the sea and you would have to pay me a lot more to change that". 
Mr W is concerned about the future of trek fishing. His sister has two sons, neither of which has ever 
been involved in trek fishing. When asked why this was Mr W answered 
"There is no future I used to earn more than double what I earn now". 
As with the permit holders Mr W blames this decline in income on regulations and restrictions which 
have been imposed on the sector over the last 20 years. He feels that the regulations are unfair and 
arose due to public pressure exerted by influential recreational fishermen. 
Mr W shares many characteristics with other crewmembers in this group. That is most of these 
fishermen were over 45 and had slowly progressed to their current position within the crew. Most have 
similar incomes to Mr W and either buy and sell fish or work on the pelagic line fishing boats during 
winter. All fishermen complained about a decline in income over the last 10 years and all blamed this 
decline on what they call unfair regulations. The fishermen in this category have not been able to 
provide for their old age and will thus continue to work until they are no longer physically able. 
Thereafter they will rely on government pensions. 
Low Skill Permanent Crewmember 
Mr Z is a crewmember who hauls the net for an operation that operates in summer. He is a 28-
year-old coloured male and has been working as a trekker since he left school after completing 
matric. A friend introduced MR Z into the profession; he has been working for ten years and 
occasionally rows for the team. Over the ten-year period Mr Z has worked for two permit 
holders. He has a wife and a child and lives with his parents, brother, sister in law and their two 
children. His income along with his brother who works as a store clerk and his parents whom 
receive government pensions are pooled and go toward maintaining the household. According 
to this paper Mr Z earns R 10 200 per season. This was concurred by Mr Z. 
During the winter months he seeks employment on pelagic line fishing boats. However he has 
also worked as a gardener and on construction sites. He estimates that 80% of his income is due 
to trek fishing. Thus resulting in an annual income ofR12 750 or R1275 per month. As with all 
other interviewees Mr Z expressed concern about the future of trek fishing. He was particularly 
concerned about the loss of white steenbras as a target species. 
" In the mornings we make a "blinde" trek and usually get a couple of steenbras for the crew, I 
always bring home this fish for dinner". 
He argued that the long periods of waiting for catches were sustainable due to these catches 
which keep money in crewmembers pockets or provide food for the families. As with the other 
groups of fishermen Mr Z argued that a poor public perception has resulted in restrictive 
regulations, which have lead to a decline in his income over the last 10 years. Mr Z stated that 
his entry into the industry was largely due to a lack of alternatives. He is worried about the 
future of the industry and argues that it is not easy to find work in other fishing sectors. Mr Z 
identifies himself strongly as a trek fisherman and argues that he loves his job. However if a 
more stable and consistent income source were to present itself he would take it. 
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Mr Z shares many characteristics with other the other fisherman in this labour group. That is, most of 
the fishermen in this group are under 40 years of age and are working their way up the crew hierarchy. 
For all crewmembers in this labour group the level of incomes earned, number of dependants and 
socio-economic situation were similar to Mr Z. Furthermore most of these fishermen do find 
employment when fishing does not take place. However this employment generally contributes less 
than 25% to annual income. Finally all fishermen in this group expressed concern about the future of 
trek fishing. 
It has been noted that the Smitswinkel Bay crewmembers are racially, socially and economically 
distinct from all other crews. That is they are all "white", have work during the off-season which 
contributes on average 70% to annual income, have fewer dependants and partake in the industry by 
choice rather than through a lack of alternatives 12. 
12 These distinctions hold for all labour groups within this crew. Due to the scope of the paper it was not possible to include 
interviews with this crew or to discuss why they are an all "white" crew. It is however important to note that they are 
considerably wealthier than any of the other crews and thus more resilient to any loss of income. 
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4. The Generation of Revenue by the False Bay Beach-Seine Net Fishery. 
This section illustrates how the False Bay trek fishermen generate revenue. It does this by discussing 
what species of fish are caught, when these species are caught and how much is paid for each species. 
Total revenue is then calculated and the effects of new and proposed management decisions on revenue 
are examined. 
4.1 Catch Composition for the Industry 
At present beach-seine net fisheries in the Western Cape may legally target two species of fish namely 
Liza richardsonii (harder) and Callorhinchus capensis (St Joseph). An exception has been made for 
False Bay trek fisherman who argued that they had traditionally targeted other species. Thus the 
catching of Serio/a lalandi (yellow tail) and Lithognathus lithognathus (white steenbras) has been 
allowed. However from the year 2001 white steenbras may no longer be targeted. Any other species 
caught are considered by catch and may be sold if they are not a prohibited species. Within False Bay 
the species that contributed significantly to total catch (in kilograms) are presented in Figure 3 below. 
The totals presented below have been scaled up using Lamberth's adjustments (1994). As was noted 
earlier only five of the seven operators returned catch cards, therefore two crews have been omitted 
from this discussion . 
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Figure 3. The six species that contribute significantly in terms of mass (kilograms) to the False Bay 
beach-seine net fishing industry. 
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From the figure it is clear that harders contribute over 60% to total catch, the next largest contributors 
are yellow tail, white steenbras, kob (Agrosomus inodorus) and elf (Pomatomus saltrix). It is important 
to note that other species of fish such as belman, St Joseph, white stumpnose, strepies, pilchards and 
snoek were caught by trek fishermen. These species contributed less than 5% to total catch and total 
revenue and were thus excluded from the analysis. 
4.2 Catch Composition and Seasonality for Each Operator 
The figure above depicts the relative importance of each species for the entire industry. However each 
species relative importance varies from one operation to the next and in most cases is inconsistent with 
the relative importance each species holds for the industry' s total catch. The reason for this is that 
permit holders are restricted to certain areas. These areas differ in the habitats they provide, and 
consequently in the species they commonly yield. Furthermore a closed season requires that all species 
except harders be returned between 1st May and 30th October13. Hence operations which don' t catch 
significant quantities of harders can only operate between 31 st October and 30th April. The figures 
below depict the monthly catch for each significant species for each operator. 
Harder 
•Elf 
D V\Aiite steenbras 
DKob 
• Yell01Ntail 
Figure 4. Total monthly catches for each species for the Muizenberg/Strandfontein and Macassar 
operator. 
13 This regulation is somewhat unnecessary as most species caught by trek fishermen migrate out of False Bay during winter 
and return during spring. 
I 
13 
This is only one of two crews, which operate through out the year. Harders are the most significant 
species and are caught throughout the year. There were some large catches during the winter but there 
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Figure 5. Total monthly catch of harder for the Muizenberg/Strandfontein operator. 
This is the second operator who fishes through out the year. The high levels ofharders caught during 
May and June were somewhat anomalous as this crew's catch normally falls during winter. White 
stumpnose, elf, white steenbras and kob are caught in significant quantities during summer but their 
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Figure 6. Monthly catches for the Glencairne operator. 
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This operator does not fish during winter. Relative to the above crews they catch few harders. However 
this crew catches significant quantities of yellow tail and white steenbras. 
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Figure 7. Total monthly catch for the Fishoek permit holder. 
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This operation is similar to the Glencaime operation in that they don' t operate in winter and rely on the 
same three species of fish. Over recent years the white steenbras catch at Fishoek has fallen 
considerably, consequently this operation depends on yellow tail. Harders constitute a very small 
proportion of total catch. 
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Figure 8. Total monthly catch for the Smitswinkel Bay permit holder. 
The Smitswinkel Bay operation closes for the winter months. It relies on yellow tail for revenue. Small 
quantities of harder are also caught but contribute negligibly to revenue and total catch. 
The above figures depict when fish are caught and provide an adequate explanation for the variability 
in monthly income trek fishermen earn. These figures don' t however show the relative importance each 
species has to total revenue. The reason being that different species command different prices per 
kilogram. It therefore follows that each species proportional contribution to total income differs from 
its proportional contribution to total mass. Before revenues can be calculated the fish selling and price 
system needs to be discussed. 
4.3 Fish Sales and Prices. 
Fish price data were provided by an agent who buys and sell for I&J. This monger has been the sole 
large scale buyer of fish caught by the beach-seine net fishermen in False Bay for over twenty years. 
The operators at Fishoek, Smitswinkel Bay and Glencaime estimate that this buyer buys 90% of their 
catch. The remaining two operators are the north shore operators who estimate that only 50% of their 
catch is bought by this buyer. The reason for this is that these crews catch is dominated by harders, 
most of which are sold to small-scale buyers. Furthermore he offers a set seasonal price for each 
species 14. 
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Despite the set price offered payments to fishermen can vary for species-specific reasons. The False 
Bay trek fishermen are the only commercial fishery that catches white steenbras. Thus trek fishermen 
can supply as much white steenbras as they wish without prices falling. Fishermen received R13.5 
per/Kg for the year 2000 for fish of reasonable size and quality. However if quality and size were poor 
prices fell to R12.5 per/Kg. 
Yell ow tail prices vary inversely with the supply of yellow tail by other fishing sectors and directly 
with quality. The price paid for yellow tail during the year 2000 was R12per/Kg. However if supply 
was high and quality was average the buyer offered Rl 1 per/Kg. Yellow tail doesn't keep well 
unfrozen and may become slightly toxic. Thus poor quality fish were seldom bought. 
Kob and elf are the smallest contributors to total catch for trek fishermen. They are generally caught in 
small shoals and receive a fixed price, which for the year 2000 was R12 and R9 per/Kg respectively. If 
the supply of these species was high, size was small or quality was poor the fish buyer offered Rl 
per/Kg less for each of these species. The trek fishermen interviewed concurred with the above 
information except in one instance. During December of 2000 one crew made a massive kob haul. The 
fish buyer only paid R6 per/Kg for these fish. When questioned about this he argued that many of these 
fish were undersize and that the haul was so large it flooded the market for kob. 
14 Set prices are offered due to the fact that the trek fishing industry often provides fish when other sectors have not caught. 




The harder price and selling system differs from that of the other species. The I&J fish buyer buys 
approximately 45% of all harders caught. For the year 2000 he paid R2.20 per/Kg for harders. However 
if the supply was high, quality poor and size small he offered Rl.90 per/Kg. Another 45% are sold to 
small-scale buyers. Of the two crews that caught significant amounts of harder one argued that the 
prices received for these fish were similar to those paid by I&J while the other crew argued that prices 
were lower. However the fishermen keep no records and it was impossible to gain an accurate measure 
of fish price and price elasticity. 
The set price paid for each species over the last three years were available and were used to calculate 
the average annual change in set price fishermen received. This is presented in the table below. 
Species Harder Yellow tail White steenbras Elf Koh 
Percentage change 12.2 % 4.2% 6.2% 5.9% 4.2 % 
in price 
Table 1. Average annual change in price by species. 1998-2000 (l&J prices). 
Regardless of who buys the fish, 10% of total catch accrues to crewmembers in two forms. First as 
" fry", these are fish that each crewmember receives over and above their share of the catch. These fish 
can be eaten or sold. They are generally sold to restaurants, next to the road or to fish shops. Secondly 
some crews have a system called "fuzzies". "Fuzzies are fish which are sold to the public on the beach 
in the first half an hour after the catch is landed. Prices received for "fuzzies" and "fry" are typically 
20%-25% higher than those paid by large-scale fish buyers 15. Permit holders receive no income from 
"fry" and "fuzzies", crew members take 10% of the catch once this has been done the remainder is sold 
and divided amongst the permit holder and crew. 
15 For all crews interviewed regardless of whether they used the "fiy", "fuzzies" or both systems the percentage of total 







4.4 Species Contribution to Revenue. 
To obtain gross revenue estimates, scaled catches were adjusted down by 10% to correct for "fry" and 
"fuzzies" 16, this adjusted catch was then multiplied by the set price l&J (see table 1.) paid for each 
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Figure 9. The proportion each species contributes toward total revenue for the False Bay beach-seine 
net fishery. 
It is interesting to note that though harder contribute most to total catch in kilograms they contribute 
only 30% to total revenue. Yellow tail contribute most significantly (45%) with kob (7%) and white 
steenbras (15%) also contributing significantly to revenues. Other species contribute insignificantly to 
total catch and total revenue, and are generally kept by the crew as "fry". These species were excluded 
from this discussion. The loss of white steenbras would lower revenue for the entire industry by 15%, 
however this loss would be felt asymmetrically with some crews being unaffected. The two crews 
excluded from this analysis catch significant amounts of white steenbras and yellow tail. These figures 
therefore underestimate these species' contribution 17. 
16 "Fry" and "fuzzies" can be viewed as a 10% loss of income for permit holder as they do not receive any of the income 
~enerated through these systems. 
7 Although no catch records were available for the two missing operators it is valid to make this statement for three reasons. 
Firstly both operations are located in the south where habitats are suitable for these species. Second, one operation is at 
Fishoek and catches similar species to the other Fishoek operation. The second operation is at Simons Town and catches 
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Figure 10. The proportion each species contributes toward total revenue for each permit holder. 
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The Smitswinkel Bay, Fishoek and Glencaime crews rely heavily on yellow tail. White steenbras 
contributes 30% and 11 % toward total revenue for the Glencaime and Fishoek operations respectively. 
The crews operating on the northern shore rely heavily on harder (>40%) for revenue. Yell ow tail 
contributes more than 20% to total revenue for the Muizenberg/Strandfontein and Macassar operator. 
The Muizenberg/Strandfontein crew caught large quantities ofkob in two hauls. However they 
received only R6 per kg for these fish due to the small size and large quantity of the fish. Thus kob 
contributed negligibly toward total revenue. Elf contributes small amounts to total revenue for the 
north shore operators and, as with all other species except harder, are only caught in summer. 
4.5 Revenue Estimations and the Change in Revenue Associated with Management 
Decisions 
The total revenue calculated as described above is presented for each operator in the table 2. Two 
measures of total revenue are presented. Namely revenue from all fish caught and revenue from all fish 
except those caught on weekends and public holidays during the year 2000. 
I 
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Operator Muizenberg Muizenbergl Glencairne Fishoek Smitswinkel 
and Macassar Strandfontein Bay 
Revenue from R600 865.03 R 295 768.9 R 355 554.7 R 377 118.9 R200 040.6 
all catches 











Table 2. Total revenue for each crew, with revenue calculated for total catch and for total catch less 
weekend and public holiday catch. 
From the above it is clear that removing fishing rights for weekends and public holidays will have a 
profound impact on all operators, revenue falls range from 14 .5% to 41 %. There are several reasons for 
this decline. Firstly the number of days which can be fished is already restricted by the availability of 
fish and adequate weather conditions. Second, yellow tail are the most important species for operators 
in the south and are caught by visually locating shoals. Furthermore over 95% of all yellow tail catches 
are larger than 500kg, each catch is therefore worth approximately R6000. The correct weather 
conditions are essential for catching yellow tail hence removing fishing days when catches could be 
made could prove disastrous. Third, during the summer months 28% of all days are weekends and 




This accounts for more than one quarter of all days that could be spent fishing if every day was suitable 
for fishing. This is however not the case and on average fishermen argue that they fish 3-4 times per 
week. The north shore operators who operate throughout the year catch relatively few yellow tail and 
rely on "blinde" treks for the bulk of their catch. It therefore follows that they would be effected less by 
this proposal. However the Muizenberg/Strandfontein crew caught large shoals on what could be 
restricted days. Under the proposed regulation they would have experienced a 38% decline in income. 
Similarly the Smitswinkel Bay crew caught large shoals of yellow tail during the Christmas season of 
2000; their income would have fallen by 41 %. This indicates the random nature of the industry where 
large periods of time are spent waiting for shoals of fish. Furthermore the level of effort exerted by 
crews is already at a maximum and operators could not fish more on other days to make up this loss of 
income. This proposal is therefore aimed to minimise conflict between the fishing sectors and is not 
based on scientific or economic evidence. 
The table below shows the loss incurred by operators due to the loss of white steenbras as a legitimate 
target species. 
Operator Muizenberg Muizenbergl Glencairne Fishoek Smitswinkel 
and Macassar Strandfontein Bay 
Revenue from all R600 865.03 R 295 768.9 R 355 554.7 R 377 118.9 R200 040.6 
catches 
Total revenue R 553 276.15 R 289 170.2 R 214 526.5 R297 961.2 NIA 
less revenue from 
white steenbras 
8% 2% 40 % 21 % 0% 
Percentage loss 
in Revenue 
Table 3. Total revenue for all crews, with revenue totals for total catch and total catch less white 
steenbras. 
22 
The removal of white steenbras as a legitimate target species impacts on four of the operators with 
losses of revenue ranging from 2% to 40%. Whether this loss is significant will be discussed in section 
SlX. 
The effect on income of the possible removal of kob as a commercial species is depicted in the table 
below. 
Operator Muizenberg and Muizenbergl Glencairne Fishoek Smitswinkel 
Macassar Strandfontein Bay 
Revenue from R600 865.03 R 295 768.9 R 355 554.7 R 377 118.9 R200 040.6 
all catches 
Total revenue R538 495.0 R 260 600.4 NIA NIA NIA 
less revenue 
fromkob 
10.4 % 12% 0% 0% 0% 
Percentage loss 
in Revenue 
Table 4. Total revenue for all crews, with revenue generated from total catch and total catch less kob 
catches. 
From the table above it is clear that removing kob as a commercial species will only affect two 
operators . The Muizenberg/Strandfontein operator will be severely affected with a loss of 12% in 
income. However this crew caught a few very large hauls of kob and were paid half the set price for 
these fish. Had they received the set price this loss of revenue would have been larger. The only other 
crew affected lost 10.4 % of its revenue. Whether these losses of income are significant will be 
discussed in section 6. 
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5. Costs Associated with Beach-Seine Net Fishing in False Bay. 
The costs of running a beach-seine net fishing operation were calculated for each permit holder 
interviewed. It should be noted that of the seven permit holders only four could be interviewed. As the 
information on costs was obtained through interviews only four operators are discussed. For a 
complete break down of how each permit holders costs were calculated see appendix C. This paper 
addresses three types of costs facing permit holders: investment costs, annual costs and opportunity 
costs. Each of these are discussed separately, thereafter a comment on annual and opportunity costs 
facing crewmembers is made. 
5.1 Investment Costs. 
The investment costs was calculated for each permit holder. It constituted the replacement cost of all 
the equipment presently used by the operator. Generally crews use nets, boats, oars, cars, trailers, 
oilskins, wet suites, life jackets, binoculars and sunglasses. In some cases when equipment is not stored 
on the beach storage facilities have been built. 
5.2 Annual Costs. 
Annual or running costs were calculated for each crew. This included the maintenance cost for all 
equipment, trek fishing license fees, boat survey licence fees and municipal fees for boat storage and 
the use of cars on beaches. Depreciation costs for fishing equipment were obtained by dividing the 
replacement cost of the equipment by its life span. This was feasible as the equipment lasts a long time 
and its rate of depreciation is roughly constant, allowing linear depreciation. Maintenance and 
depreciation costs were summed to obtain annual or running costs. 
5.3 Total Cost. 
Smitswinkel Muizenbergl Muizenbergl Fishoek 
Bay Strandf ontein Strandfontein 
and Macassar 
Investment R127 038 R202 080 R80295 R130284 
Cost 
Annual or R15 658.2 R38 579.5 R22169.9 R25103.8 
Running 
Cost 
Table 5. Total investment and annual costs accruing to the Beach-seine net fishermen interviewed. 
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Table 6 below indicates the annual running or operating costs as well as the fixed costs for all permit 
holders interviewed. The low investment cost of the Muizenberg/Strandfontein permit holder is due to 
the fact that this operator has just begun his own operation and has less equipment than the other 
operations. Hence the other operations investment costs are far larger. The Muizenberg/Strandfontein 
and Macassar permits holder owns the most equipment, hence his high investment costs. Furthermore 
he transports crewmembers and equipment to the beach. He uses two cars and operates throughout the 
year and incurs high running costs. The Muizenberg/Strandfontein permit holders operates throughout 
the year but relies on one car hence petrol and vehicle depreciation major contributors to total cost, are 
less. The Fishoek and Smitswinkel Bay crews operate only in summer. Both crews have similar 
amounts of equipment. The reason for Fishoek' s high running cost is that they have two cars that are 
used daily. The Smitswinkel Bay permit holder is not actively involved in trek fishing, crew members 
provide their own transport and fish are transported by boat. Thus no vehicle cost is included resulting 
in low running costs for this permit holder. The transporting of fish by boat to Kalk Bay costs this 
operation R600 per ton of fish. This cost is born by both the permit holder and crew as transport costs 
are subtracted from total revenue before it is shared. 
5.4 Cost Accruing to Crewmembers. 
Crewmembers are also faced with costs even though they have no responsibility toward supplying 
equipment. For all crews except the Smitswinkel Bay crew the operator supplied transport. For the 
Smitswinkel Bay crew the annual transport costs were calculated using the AA' s per rate kilometre and 
came to R3 744 per person per season. Furthermore all crews have to supply their own food however as 
crews would have had to eat regardless of whether they fished or not this cost is not included. In some 
cases spotters had to purchase their own binoculars and sunglasses. These are replaced every 2 years 
and cost on average R720 and R600 respectively. Thus for all crews except the Smitswinkel Bay crew 
there were no costs arising due to their occupation. 
5.5 Opportunity Costs. 
Three types of opportunity cost will be discussed. The first is the opportunity cost of the capital 
invested by the permit holders and is the amount of interest they would have gained had they invested 
their money in a financial institution instead of in equipment. The long-term savings rate of 10.2% was 
used. Second, the opportunity cost of the permit holders' labour (if they actively participated in 
trekking) was calculated as the wage they would receive if they worked in the pelagic line fishery. This 
being the sector in which trekkers would most easily find employment. 
Furthermore due to permit holder's capital investment and skill as mariners the wage they would 
probably receive would be that of a boat owner. Third, crewmember' s opportunity costs were 
calculated as the income that they would have received as crewmembers on pelagic line-fishing 
vessels. These figures are presented in table 7 below. 
Smitswinkel Muizenbergl Muizenbergl Fishoek 
Bay Macassar Strandfontein 
Capital R12 958 R20 612.2 R8 190.1 R13 289 
Opportunity 
cost 










Table 6. The annual opportunity costs which face trek fishermen during 2000. ( McGrath et.al 1997) 
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The Smitswinkel Bay operator has no opportunity cost of labour as he is not physically involved in 
beach-seine net fishing and merely rents and maintains the equipment and permit. Similarly the 
Muizenberg and Macassar permits owner is 66 years of age and operates in a similar manner. However 
although these permits fall under one operator they are held under two names. The one partner is 
actively involved while the other supplies most of the equipment and is concerned with the upkeep. As 
equipment is shared it was not possible to assertion what belonged to whom. This paper combined the 
costs of the operation under one person and labour opportunity cost was included. 
18 McGrath et.al. (1997) showed that boat owners earn R460 per trip. Trek fishermen claimed to fish 98 days during the 
summer season and 156 days for the entire year. Thus the wage was multiplied by the number of days fished . 
19 McGrath et.al. (1997) showed that pelagic line boat crewmembers earned R63 per trip. This was multiplied by the 
number of days fished and labour opportunity cost was obtained. 
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The Fishoek operator treks during the summer but trekking is his sole source of income thus the full 
year' s labour opportunity cost is used. All the Fishoek crewmembers interviewed had work during the 
2001 winter but the income earned contributed less than 25% to annual income. Thus the full years 
labour opportunity cost was used. 
6. Incomes Earned by Trek Fishermen in this Study. 
This section examines the incomes that permit holders and crewmembers receive. It does this by 
explaining how revenue is divided within each crew, costs are subtracted to obtain income for the year 
2000. Present feasibility is then commented on and the effects of new and proposed management 
decisions on income are examined. 
6.1 Revenue Division 
Like share cropping beach-seine net fishing does not pay a fixed wage but is based on a system of risk 
sharing between crews and permit holders. Crewmembers and permit holders only receive income if 
fish are caught. Table 8 below indicates how revenue is shared between the crewmembers. The 
revenue figure is total revenue less10% (loss due to " fry" and "fuzzies"). Transport costs ofR600 per 
ton were subtracted from this total for the Smitswinkel Bay operation. The permit holders' revenue is 
calculated as 50% of this total except for the Muizenberg/Strandfontein and Macassar permit operation 
where 40% goes to the permit holder. Prices received for " fry" and "fuzzies" are on average 20% more 
than those received by I&J. Hence this value is 20% higher than the value of the loss to the permit 
holder. The crew' s revenue is thus their share of total revenue (50% for all except for the 
Muizenberg/Strandfontein and Macassar permits operation where 40% is received) plus the value of 
the " fry" and "fuzzies". The crew' s revenue is divided into shares with each member gaining shares in 
accordance with his function. 
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Smitswinkel Muizenbergl Muizenbergl Fishoek 
Bay Strandfontein and Strandfontein 
Macassar 
Total Revenue Generated R169 938.2 R540778.52 R266 192 R339 407 
from all catches less 
"Fuzzies" and "Fry" 
R84 969.1 R216311.4 R130 096 R169 703.5 
Permit Holders Revenue 
Share 
Value of "fry" and "fuzzies" R21 604.4 R72 103.803 R35 492.3 R45 254.3 
RI06 573.5 R288 415.2 Rl65 561.3 R214 957.8 
Crews Revenue 
Average crew size 8 18 15 15 
Average number of shares 10 21 18 18.5 
Value per shar~11 RIO 657.4 R 13 734.1 R9 197.8 Rl 1 619.4 
Table 7. Total annual revenue division for beach-seine net fishermen. 
The Muizenberg/Strandfontein permit holder receives comparatively little revenue when compared 
with the only other crew operating through out the year. Namely the Muizenberg/Strandfontein and 
Macassar operation that has the highest revenue and crew share. Furthermore these operators' crew 
shares are for the entire year while the other two crews share is for summer only. The Smitswinkel Bay 
crew share is relatively high due to their small crew. 
20 Share value is obtained by dividing crew revenue by the average number of shares. 
6.2 Returns to Permit Holders 
This section evaluates the returns that permit holders receive. It does this by first examining the 
accounting profit or income calculated as: 
Income = Revenue - Total Annual Cost. 
Secondly the economic or excess profit is calculated as: 
Economic Profit = Income - Investment and Labour Opportunity Cost. 
This gives an indication of how lucrative the operation is compared to the permit holder's next best 
employment alternative. 
Finally the rate of return on initial capital investment is calculated. This is calculated according to 
Yater's (1982) method as: 
Rate of Return = (accounting profit - labour opportunity cost) / investment cost. 
28 
The rate ofreturn is measured against the long-term savings rate of 10.2% to see if the industry yields 
better returns than if the money was invested in a financial institution. 
The results for all crews are presented in table 9 below. These results are then discussed with regard to 
the results presented in tables 2,3 and 4 ( decline in income through regulations). 
Permit Holders Return Muizenberg/ Muizenberg/ Fishoek Smitswinkel 
Strandfontein and Strandfontein Bay 
Macassar 
Accounting or Income Rl77 731.9 R107 926.1 R144 599.7 R69 310.9 
Economic or Excess R95 851.1 R42 486.3 R72 411.36 R52 160.8 
Profit 
Rate of Return 60% 66% 69% 54% 
Table 8. Returns received by permit holders for the year 2000. 
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From the table above it is clear that all permit holders are receiving more than their opportunity cost of 
participation and are receiving extremely high returns on their initial investment. Furthermore all 
permit holders (unlike crewmembers) fall into the upper two quintiles of South African incomes. This 
is particularly interesting when one considers that only two crews operate through out the year. The 
Smitswinkel Bay permit holder is the only operator who works during the rest of the year, the other 
permit holders rely solely on this income. It can therefore be concluded that under the present 
management policies all permit holders find the industry profitable. 
To assess the impact of new and proposed management decisions this paper examined the fall in 
revenue required before each operator failed to cover his opportunity costs21. This was compared to the 
hypothetical loss of income through new and proposed regulations, the results are presented below. 
Reduction of Muizenberg/ Muizenberg/ Fishoek Smitswinkel 
Income Strandfontein and Strandfontein Bay 
Macassar 
Maximum 53% 39% 50% 75% 
Sustainable Loss 
Loss of Revenue 14.5% 38% 24% 41% 
through loss of 
weekends and 
public holiday 
Loss of Revenue 8% 2% 21% 0% 
due to loss of White 
steenbras catches 
Loss of revenue due 10.4% 12% 0% 0% 
to loss of Koh 
catches 
Table 9. The maximum sustainable loss and the fall in revenue associated with new and proposed 
management policies. 
21 This amount by which income had to fall before opportunity costs were covered is termed the maximum sustainable loss. 
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From the table above it is clear that from the permit holders perspective none of the regulations would 
cause them to reinvest their time and capital. Only the Muizenberg,'Strandfontein operation would be in 
danger of collapsing if weekend and public holidays were removed. None of the other regulations 
would affect the permit holder' s decision to be active in the industry. It should be noted that the 
Smitswinkel Bay permit holder has no opportunity cost of labour and would thus be able to sustain a 
far larger loss of income. The problem for the permit holders is thus not their personal loss due to 
regulations but rather that these regulations would affect their ability to hold a crew together. 
6.3 Returns to Crewmembers. 
The accounting profit, economic profit ( excluding the opportunity cost of capital investment) and 
maximum sustainable loss of income were calculated for the crewmembers. These are presented in 
table 11 below. The values are calculated per share. 
Muizenberg/ Muizenberg/ Fishoek Smitswinkel 
Strandfontein and Strandfontein Bay 
Macassar 
Accounting Profit or R13 734.1 R9 197.8 Rl 1 619.4 R6 913.4 
Income 
Economic or Excess R6 234.1 R 1 697.8 R 4 119.4 R3 163.4 
Profit 
Maximum Sustainable 45% 18% 35% 45% 
Loss 
Table 10. Returns to crew members and maximum sustainable loss in income they could endure per 
share. 
The Muizenberg,'Strandfontein and Macassar permits operation is the most sustainable. Crewmembers 
earn most here but income is for the entire year. Non of the regulations would result in a decrease of 
income below the R7500 opportunity cost mark. However the crews average earning places the bulk of 
its crewmembers in the second lowest income quintile in South Africa. Furthermore a quarter of the 
crewmembers are paid a half share. Thus their income is R6 867 per annum and economic profits are 
negative. Further losses in income would result in increased impoverishment and could decrease 
crewmembers' participation rate. 
The Muizenberg/Strandfontein crew is closest to earning their opportunity cost of labour. The 
maximum sustainable loss this crew could endure would be 18% and the 38% fall in income due to 
weekend and public holiday exclusion would be disastrous. This crew operates through out the year 
and a 38% reduction in income would reduce annual income to R5 702.6 per share. 
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Fishoek crewmembers operate in summer; their maximum sustainable loss is 35%. A loss of24% due 
to the exclusion of weekends and public holidays would result in a seasonal income ofR8 830 and 
would cover their opportunity cost of labour. Crewmembers earning one share belong to the lowest 
income quintile in the country. The loss of white steenbras (21 % ) will impact heavily on this crew. It 
is not only the 21 % loss of income but rather that this income is used as a "crutch" by this crew. That is 
this crew goes to the beach before sunrise and throws "blinde" treks which generally yield small 
quantities of white steenbras. These fish go to the crew as fry and provides income that crews use to 
cover costs while waiting on the beach. There are often periods of up to two weeks where nothing is 
caught and loosing the only source of income that tides crewmembers over lean catch periods will have 
a pronounced impact. Permit holders expressed concern about keeping crews together during fishless 
periods without this form of income. 
Smitswinkel Bay crewmembers have higher costs as they supply their own transport. A loss of 41 % of 
revenue due to the exclusion of weekends and public holidays could be fatal for this operation as they 
rely solely on yellow tail and fish only in the summer months. All crewmembers interviewed from this 
crew were white and had stable work during the winter months. Thus their opportunity cost of labour 
would most likely be higher than the estimated R3750 for the season. Hence their maximum 
sustainable loss may be an over estimate. 
It should be noted that the above discussion makes reference to crewmembers earning one share. These 
crewmembers are the largest income group within a crew. Crewmembers earning more than one share 
will earn the accounting profit from one share plus the revenue from the remaining shares they receive. 
The above discussion shows that any fall in income will effect crewmembers more than permit holders. 
Loosing weekends and public holidays could prove disastrous for two crews discussed. The loss of 
white steenbras will only effect the Fishoek operation, whether this loss is significant depends on how 
heavily the crew relies on the same consistent income flow white steenbras provide. Furthermore the 
three operations not included in this discussion also depend on white steenbras. 
Hence this new regulation may have a profound impact on the False Bay trek fishermen. The loss of 
kob as a target species would not result in significant losses of income for any operation. However 
crewmembers are generally so poor that any loss of income regardless of its size has an impact. 
7. Long Term Feasibility of the Operations in this Study. 
The section above depicted the feasibility of each operation under static conditions. This section 
attempts to determine the feasibility of each operation over the long term under three sets of 
assumptions. Three models each based on a set of assumption are put forward and predict the net 
present value (NPV) of each permit over a 30-year period22. These models are based on renewable 
resource stock harvest and growth models. 
7. 1 The Models 
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The first set of assumptions is that the catch levels for each species for the year 2000 remain constant 
over the next 30 years. This assumes that all species are being harvested at the same rate they are 
growing, thus stocks and harvest remain constant. What this means in terms of income is that revenue 
will only increase due to an increase in fish prices and not harvest size. Costs are assumed to increase at 
the average rate of inflation for the last three years (i.e.8.2%, Reserve Bank)23 . The discount rate used 
was the long-term savings rate of 10.2%24. 
Thus model 1 calculates the NPV of income for permit holders as: 
l(
Kilograms of Fish ( excluding fry) x Jl 
~ Price of Fish(l + Annual Average Change in Price) 1 x (11(1 + Discount Rate) 1 ) 
- Total Cost x ( 1 + Inflation Rate )1 
The NPV of crewmember' s income had to be calculated separately in order to incorporate the value of 
"fry". This was calculated as: 
22 
A period of30 years was used due to the fact that the most expensive equipment namely the nets last approximately 30 
years. Thereafter a major investment on the part of the permit holders is incurred. The changes in equipment prices are 
difficult to predict after this period as most of the equipment is hand made with imported material. Costs could therefore 
only be accurately estimated until a major reinvestment occurs. 
23 
This was used due to the fact that the change in fish prices obtained from I&J includes only the last three years. 
24 
The discount rate can be viewed as the preference of income now over income in the future. As fishermen live largely 
day to day it is justifiable to use a high discount rate. 
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[
( Crew Share of Kilograms of Fish Caught x J 
1=so Fish Price (1 + Change in Fish Price) t) + L x (1 /(1 + Discount Rate) 1 ) 
1= o (Kil grams of" Fry" x Price of" Fry" ( 1 + Change in Fish Price) 1 
- ( Crew Costs x ( 1 + Inflation Rate ) 1 
This was performed for each species and each fish price. 
The second set of assumptions is that all species continue along their current levels of stock decline. 
That is harvest is larger than growth and stocks continue to decline, there is no management 
intervention and fish stocks continue to decline. The Sea Fisheries Department considers a species 
sustainable under current levels of exploitation if its current stock levels are at least 40% of its stock 
levels in a pristine environment. All species in this model except yellow tail are below the sustainable 
level. Therefore yellow tail catch is held constant for all three models. White steenbras is no longer a 
target species as its stocks have fallen below the minimum threshold level. Hence it was included for 
year the 2000 and excluded thereafter. The trend depicting a decline in Kob stocks indicates a 90% 
decline over the last 30 years (Griffiths 1997). Thus a 90% change in catch levels is projected. Harder 
stock levels have not been researched however researchers feel that they are declining, a 5% reduction 
in catch per annum was assumed. Elf stocks are at 36% of their pristine level, the rate of decline in elf 




l ((Permit Holders Share of Kilograms of Fish x ( 1 + Change in Fish Stocks) 
1 JJ 
L x Price of Fish ( 1 + Change in Fish Price) 1 x (1 /(1 + DiscountRate) 1 
1=0 




Note that the change in fish stocks is negative hence catch falls at the rate of stock decline. The NPV of 




( Crew Share of Kilograms of Fish x ( 1 + Change in Fish stocks) 1 ) x 
(Price of Fish (1 + Change in Price)')+ 
(Kilograms of Fry x ( 1 + Change in Fish Stocks) 1 ) 
x (Fry Price x (1 + Change in Fish Price) 1 ) 
( Crew Cost x ( 1 + Inflation Rate) 1 
x (1 /(1 + Discount Rate) 1 ) 
The third set of assumptions assumes that management policies result in stocks being restored to a 
sustainable level. Hence management policies force a decrease in effort, growth becomes larger than 
effort and stocks grow. These stocks continue to grow until the stocks reach the 40% level. Once this is 
reached, effort is allowed to increase such that harvest equals growth and stocks remain constant. The 
model does this by firstly assuming that current management policies result in stock growth for 10 
years, hereafter stocks are held constant25. That is stocks grow for 10 years, reach a sustainable leveI26, 
and for the next 20 years are held constant. Information pertaining to projected stock growth was not 
obtainable for harder, elf and kob, a 5% increase per annum was therefore assumed. Model 2' s 
equation was used to calculate the NPV of income for the first 10 years (with positive population 
changes). Thereafter model 1 ' s method ( with scaled catch size) was used to calculate the remaining 20 
years NPV. 
25 This is true for all significant species caught except yellow tail and white steenbras. Yellow tail catch is assumed to be 
constant for the 30-year period. White steenbras are excluded from the model for the first 10 years under the new 
management decision. Thereafter they are reintroduced at their historical catch levels. Thus effort is completely eradicated 
for 10 years, after this period the stocks have grown to a sustainable level and management allows effort to increase such 
that harvest equals growth. 
26 Sustainable catch levels were obtained by calculating the size of the catch in year 10. White steenbras sustainable catch 
levels were estimated from discussions with fishermen and management. 
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7.2 Results and Discussion 
The values obtained for each operation and for each model are presented in the table below. Results 
obtained are highlighted and discussed thereafter. 
Model 1 Modell Model2 Model2 Model3 Model3 




Permit Holder R2 285 546 R8 465 420 RI 564 777 R4 224 193 R2 510 574 R14 870 915 
Crew R2 508 765 R8 706 654 R2 018 778 R4 764 258 R3 151 854 Rl9 546 830 
Total R4 794 311 R17172 074 R3 583 565 RB 988 451 RS 662428 R34 417 745 
Muizenberg 
IStrandfontein 
Permit Holder RI 803 823 R6 492 400 Rl 142 916 R 2 535 634 R2 256 574 Rl3 832 638 
Crew RI 915 664 R7 305 706 RI 032 808 RI 854 623 R2 463 591 RI7 859 622 
Total R3 719 487 R13 798106 Rl 175 724 R4390257 R 4 720165 R31692 260 
I 
Fisboek 
Permit Holder RI 483 991 RS 104 840 RI 024 896 R2 897 240 RI 059 809 Rl3 996 489 
Crew R2 028 460 R6 955 440 RI 464 299 R4 240 063 RI 443 221 Rl82l07I7 
Total R3 512451 R12060280 R2489195 R7137 303 R2 503 030 R32 207 206 
Smitswinkel 
Bay 
Permit Holder R6317623.6 
Crew R3 842 961 
Total NIA RlO 160 845 NIA NIA NIA NIA 





This discussion uses model 1 as a reference point against which the outcomes from the other two 
models can be discussed. It does so by comparing the value obtained from this model against the values 
obtained from the other models. If the fall in income associated with model 2 and 3 is greater than the 
maximum sustainable loss (MSL )27 permit holders or crews can endure, it is concluded that under the 
assumptions prevalent in that model, long term feasibility is questionable. 
When model 1 is compared with model 2 there is a large decline in the NPV of income for all crews. 
The fall in income after 10 years for the Muizenberg/Strandfontein and Macassar permit holder and 
crewmembers is insignificant. However over 30 years crewmember' s incomes fall by more than their 
MSL and the permit holders income falls by 50%. As his MSL is 53% this operator may reinvest his 
capital and time. However the crewmembers will have already left his employment before this happens. 
For the Muizenberg/Strandfontein operator and crew the loss in income after 10 and 30 years 
associated with model two is larger than their maximum sustainable loss. Thus under conditions 
prevailing in model two this operation would not survive. For the Fishoek operation the reduction in 
income associated with model two would be larger than the maximum sustainable loss for 
crewmembers for both 10 and 30 years. For the Fishoek permit holder the loss in income after 10 and 
30 years is below his maximum sustainable loss. The Smitswinkel Bay crew relies almost solely on 
yellow tail, as yellow tail stocks are at a sustainable level this operation is unaffected by the 
assumptions of model 2 and 3. The only danger to this operations existence is the proposed regulation 
to prevent fishing on public holidays and weekends. 
Model 3 represents a maximum operation value when examined over the 30-year period. Over a 10-
year period it displays a decline in income of 29% for the Fishoek28 operation. The reason for this is 
that the fall in income due to the loss of white steenbras is larger than the rise in income due to 
increased stocks of other species. This loss is however not significant as crewmembers have a MSL of 
35%. Catches vary from one season to the next and it is likely that a crews MSL may fall enough to 
make this loss of income significant. It can therefore be argued that the new policy may endanger four 
of the seven operations in False Bay. These crews should therefore be are carefully monitored to ensure 
their survival over the long term. 






8. Analysis of the Proposal to Buy Trek Fishing Permits in False Bay 
Recreational fishermen have proposed that the Marine Resource Use Fund be used to buy the trek 
fishing permits in False Bay. This section uses the values placed on permits by the three models 
discussed earlier as a platform from which this proposal is examined. 
37 
The frrst point that must be noted is that these models are not accurate. There are numerous reasons for 
this lack of accuracy. These include: 
• The prices of fish used were those paid by I&J, no small scale fish buyers prices were included and 
no accurate estimation of price elasticity was made. 
• Costs are assumed to increase at the rate of inflation, all other factors attributing to increased costs 
were ignored. 
• The rate of change in harvest is assumed to have a linear relationship with the rate of change in 
stocks. This may not be the case as harvest might rise exponentially as stocks become more 
abundant. 
• The 30-year discount period was chosen due to an inability to accurately estimate changes in costs. 
As fishermen on average work for more than 30 years the totals presented may be underestimates. 
• Stock assessment models that depict stock growth cannot regulate for all variables and are thus at 
best an estimation. 
• Model 3 assumes that stocks will reach a sustainable level after 10 years, this is an assumption and 
is not connected to any scientific evidence. 
The above discussion highlights some of the problems any model would have to deal with in order to 
be accurate. Furthermore many of these problems are not solvable as information is not available. 
Hence any model would not be entirely accurate and may result in fishermen receiving less than they 
deserve. That is not to say that the above models are useless but rather that they provide a rough 
estimate for three possible outcomes. 




The models presented earlier show high, middle and low values for each permit. When individual 
permit values are combined for each of the models they come to R108 478 056, R53 191 305 and 
R30 676 856 respectively. The first problem with this proposal is that future outcomes are 
unpredictable, all 3 models present feasible future outcomes and it is unlikely that one would be more 
correct than another. Hence deciding which value to pay would be difficult. 
Another issue is that even if the lowest values are taken the permits would cost over R30 million29. 
Purchasing these permits would be very costly and it seems ludicrous that Marine Resource Use Fund 
(that has many financial obligations to meet) be used to buy these permits. This is particularly true in 
light ofLamberth' s (1994) study that showed trek fishermen were not having a significant impact on 
the marine environment30. Hence the fund that is aimed at financing the conservation of the 
environment would be used to purchase permits from a sector that is not damaging the environment. 
Another problem with this proposal is that it neglects to include the value trek fishermen contribute to 
False Bay. They are a unique sector within the False Bay fishing community and add to the colourful 
atmosphere that is evident within False Bay. The trekkers are the oldest fishing sector in False Bay and 
still draw crowds of spectators to the beach. Furthermore they are the only providers of harders, which 
constitute a major source of protein for low-income families. The loss of this sector to False Bay would 
detract from the diversity and uniqueness of False Bay. 
There are also several practical problems with this proposal. Firstly if permits were bought and one 
operator received more than another there would be a massive outcry. Similarly within crews the 
calculation of shares would be highly contentious issue31. Another point is that this proposal would 
have implications for the entire country' s fishermen. Hutchings (2000) noted that within the Western 
I Cape only the False Bay and Saldahna Bay beach-seine net fishermen were covering their opportunity 
costs. Thus operators not making a profit could demand that their permits be bought. 
I 
I 
A final problem with this proposal is that it may not be constitutional to force trek fishermen to sell 
their permits. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into a detailed legal argument. However one 
29 Note that three crews have been excluded, hence these amounts are underestimates of what would have to be paid. 
30 Lamberth (1994) showed that trek fishermen were significantly impacting upon white steenbras stocks. However trek 
fishermen are no longer allowed to target this species. 
31 Crewmembers often share functions (one crew has four members who can row but only uses two per trek. Thus treks are 
shared between the rowers). Furthermore there are many part time fishermen whose claim on any payment could be 
contested by fulltime crewmembers. 
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argument that could be made is that section 31 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, act 
108 of 1996 is aimed at the protection of minority rights. Hence forcing fishermen to sell their permits 
may be infringing upon their rights. 
It can therefore be concluded that this proposal should be dropped as it is not practical, will cause 
problems and will be expensive. 
9. Conclusion 
The examination into the present profitability of the False Bay beach-seine net fishery showed that 
even under the stringent management policies presently imposed all participants were earning above 
their opportunity costs. When the effects of removing white steenbras as a target species were 
investigated it was shown that only the Fishoek crew would be effected. However this decline in 
income was not considered significant. The proposal to restrict fishing to weekdays would result in the 
Smitswinkel Bay and Muizenberg/Strandfontein operations demise. Removing kob as a target species 
was shown to have no significant impacts for any of the operations. The analysis of the long-term 
feasibility showed that if stocks continue to decline and white steenbras remains a restricted species all 
operations except the Smitswinkel Bay operation will cease to operate. Furthermore if stocks improve 
but white steenbras remains a restricted species for 10 years, model 3 showed that the Fishoek 
operation may find it difficult to survive. It is the recommendation of this paper that all operations 
catching significant quantities of white steenbras be periodically monitored to assess the impact the 
new regulation is having on their ability to survive. Furthermore this paper showed that the proposal to 
buy trek fishing permits in False Bay is not a feasible solution to the conflict between recreational and 
trek fishermen. Policies that are solely aimed at reducing conflict should not be implemented. 
Furthermore the trek fishermen are a unique and valuable part of False Bay and Cape Town~ their long-
term survival should be a priority for management. 
Appendix A. 
List ofrecreational fishermen's allegations against trek fishermen: 
• Large catches of adult and juvenile "angling" species have lead to the decline of angling fish 
stocks. 
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• Netting near river mouths has caused high mortality amongst juvenile fish entering and leaving the 
spawning area and on adult spawning concentrations. 
• Nets used scrap the sea floor removing large quantities ofbenthic fauna and flora. 
• Large scale removal of species results in ecological imbalances within False Bay 
• Fishermen are intruding in marine reserves. 
Appendix 8. 
Below is a list of regulations currently imposed on trek fishermen. 
• The introduction of a non-transferable permit system allowing beach-seining in specific areas. 
• Compulsory monthly catch returns recording daily catches in number and mass for each species 
must be completed. Non compliance can result in permit withdrawal. 
• Permits were issued solely for the targeting of Harders and St Joseph's but the False Bay fishery is 
allowed to target Yellowtail and white steenbras (this species has been removed as a target species 
for 2001). 
• Fishing is prohibited between sunset and sunrise. 
• Seine net fishermen in the Strand had permits revoked and the future issue of new permits in False 
Bay was prohibited. 
• Rope length and thus net access was restricted to 600m and mesh size was restricted to a minimum 
of44mm. 
• A closed season from lMay until 30th October was introduced. During this period only Harders and 
St Joseph's may be targeted. 
• The limited use of Russman nets is allowed. 
• Beach-seine net fishing is banned 500m on either side of a river mouth. 
• Buffer zones between fishing areas and marine reserves exist. 
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Appendix C 
Below is a list indicating how each replacement cost accruing to the permit holder is calculated. 
• 252m net: meshing + rope + thread + weights + floats + labour. Cost were calculated as number or 
amount used multiplied by unit price. Labour was estimated as the number of hours it takes to make 
a net multiplied by the wage commercial net makers pay. 
Cost of252m net= (63.6kg *Rl 72.57 per kg)+ (600m @R180 per 300m) + (6* R132.75) + (80kg 
*R20.88 per kg) +(1200 * R6.5)+ (480 hours *R20 per hour) 
= (R 10 975 of mesh)+ (R360 of rope)+ (R796.5 of thread) + 
(Rl 670 of weights)+ (R7 800) +(R9600) 
=R31201.5 
Plus 14% vat =R35 570. 
• 144m net. There was no accurate description of how much of each of the above inputs is used for a 
144m net. Accurate measurements were only obtainable for the 252m net. However the net builder 
who was interviewed estimated that it would take 30% less time and inputs to make. Thus the 
above total was multiplied by 0.7 to yield a 30% lower cost ofR 24 899. 
• Vehicles: estimated as the present amount that would be needed to replace the vehicle. 
• Trailers: estimated at the replacement cost for a new trailer. 
• Storage facilities: estimated at the amount it would cost to build the facilities. 
• Boats: replacement cost from commercial boat builders valued boats at R2500 for boats less than 
4m and R3000 for boats longer than 4m. 
• Oars: the commercial price of each set of oars is Rl500. 
• Wet suites: retail price ofR400 each. 
• Oil skins: retail price of R35. 
• Life jackets: retail price of R150. 
• Sun glasses: retail price ofR600 a pair 
• Binoculars: retail price ofR 720. 
Below are a list of the maintenance costs associated with the equipment. 
• Nets (maintenance costs were not significantly different for the different net sizes): labour cost per 
season + thread cost per season + mesh replacement cost per season + rope replacement cost. 
Maintenance cost = ( 50 hours* R20 per hour) + ( one third of 8kgs of mesh at R 172. 57 per kilogram) + 
(one third of 1kg of thread at R132.75 per kg)+(50% of the replacement cost for 300m of rope). 
=(RlOOO)+ (R57.52) + (R44.3) +(R90) 
=Rl 191.77 per net. 
• Boats: boats are repaired and painted every season at R250 per boat. 
• Petrol and maintenance costs for vehicles: Calculated by multiplying the monthly kilometres 
travelled by the AA's per kilometre rate that includes petrol and tyre and engine depreciation. 
• Trailers maintenance cost was estimated as R 400 per season. 
• There is no maintenance cost for equipment that has to be replaced annually or at the most 
biannually. 
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The list below indicates the costs of permits and licences to the permit holders. 
• Boat survey fees : all crews at R125 for each boat. 
• Boat licence fees: all crews at R65 per boat. 
• Municipal storage fees: Fishoek crews Pay R800 per year to store equipment on the beach. 
• Beach access fees: Muizenberg and Maccassar operators pay a R440 annual fee for driving vehicles 
down to the beach. 
The table that follows is a complete beak down of each operator' s costs as are presented in the study. 




Number 2 1 2 4 
Replacement cost R6000 R3000 R5 500 R1 2 000 
Depreciation cost R300 R150 R275 R600 
Maintenence cost R500 R250 R500 RIOOO 
Total annual cost R800 R400 R775 R 1600 
Nets (30) 
Number of252m nets. 4 1 2 2 
Replacement cost R142 280 R35 570 R71140 R71140 
Depreciation cost R4742.7 R1185 .7 R2371.1 R2371.l 
Maintenence cost R4766.8 Rl 191.7 R2383.6 R2 383.6 
Total annual cost R9509.5 R2377.4 R4 754.7 R4 754.7 
Number of 144m nets. 0 0 1 2 
Replacement cost R24 899 R49 798 
Depreciation cost R829.9 R1659.9 
Maintenence cost Rl 191.7 R2383 .6 
Total annual cost R2021.6 R4 043.5 
Vehicle (20) 
Number of vehicles 2 1 2 NIA 
Replacement cost R24 000 R19 000 R20 000 
Depreciation cost Rl9 500 Rll 700 R9750 
Total annual cost R19 500 Rll 700 R9750 
Oil Skins (2) 
Number 0 15 15 NIA 
Replacement cost R525 R525 
Depreciation cost R262 .5 R262.5 
Maintenence cost RO 0 





,.., NIA .) .) 
Replacement cost R1200 R1600 R1200 
Depreciation cost R600 R800 R600 
Maintenence cost 0 RO 0 
Total annual cost R600 R800 R600 
1 The number proceeding the equipment type is the average life span by which equipment is divided to 
yield total costs. 
Life Jackets (2) 
Number 4 4 4 0 
Replacement cost R600 R600 R600 
Depreciation cost R300 R300 R300 
Maintenence cost RO RO RO 
Total annual cost R300 R300 R300 
Sun glasses(2) 
Number 0 0 2 0 
Replacement cost RI 200 
Depreciation cost R600 
Maintenence cost 0 
Total annual cost R600 
Binoculars(2) 
Number 0 0 I 0 
Replacement cost R720 
Depreciation cost R360 
Maintenence cost 0 
Total annual cost R360 
Trailers (10) 
Number 2 I 0 NIA 
Replacement cost RI6 000 R8000 
Depreciation cost RI 600 R800 
Maintenence cost R800 R400 
Total annual cost R2400 R1200 
Storage Facilities (50) NIA 
Number I I 0 
Replacement cost R 7500 R 7500 
Depreciation cost RISO RISO 
Maintenence cost RO RO 
Total annual cost RlSO RlSO 
Liscence and Permit fees R820 R630 Rll80 R 760 
Oars (1) 
Number of oars 3 3 3 3 
Replacement cost R4500 R4500 R4500 R4500 
Depreciation cost R4500 R4500 R4500 R4500 
Maintenence cost RO RO RO RO 
Total annual cost R4500 R4500 R4500 R4500 
Total Investment Cost R202 080 R80 295 R130 284 R127 038 
Total Annual Cost R38 579.5 R22169.9 R25103.8 Rl5 658.2 
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